Tom Cooper, an Austrian aerial warfare analyst and historian, has provided a review for the last 24-36 hours (19 Mar 22, 2022).
CAA – Combined Arms Army (Russia)
BTG – Battalion Tactical Group (Russia)
GMRD – Guards Motor Rifle Division (Russia)
GTA – Guards Tank Army (Russia)
GTD – Guards Tank Division (Russia)
IFV – infantry fighting vehicle
LOC – Line of Control (old frontline between Ukraine and Separatists in the Donbass region)
MANPAD – man-protable air defence system
MBT – main battle tank
MRB – Motorized Rifle Brigade
MRD – Motorized Rifle Division
PGM – precision guided munition
RFA – Russian Federation Army/Russian Armed Forces
RF-9xxxx – Russian military aviation registration
UAF – Ukrainian armed Forces
UCAV – unmanned combat aerial vehicle
VDV – Vozdushno-desantnye voyska (Russian Airborne forces)
VKS – Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (Air-Space Force, Russia)
West OSK – Western Military District, RFA
STRATEGIC
This morning, RUMINT has it that the Belarusian railway workers have sabotaged the railway system connecting the country to Ukraine, temporarily making it impossible for the RFA to resupply by train. Seems, the troops of the 35th and 41st CAAs will be immobilised, freezing, hungry, and short on ammo for few days longer…
As expected, the ‘super-precise attack with hypersonic Kinzhal missile’, with which the Keystone Cops were boasting two days ago, turned out to be a hoax. They did launch another attack with ballistic missiles on the Ivano-Frankivsk AB, but nothing by MiG-31s, nothing by Kinzhals, nothing on any kind of ‘underground storage depot’, and the video they have released is shown a strike on the storage hall of some agricultural facility in eastern Ukraine, during the first week of war…. As said, ‘Keystone Cops in Moscow’…
NORTH & NORTH-EAST
Russians west and east of Kyiv are passive. West of the city the Ukrainians are holding their line down the Irpin River, including Irpin (and, on the outer side: Makariv), there’s fighting for Bucha, but no major action. On the eastern side, the Russians are in Borodanyka and Lukashi, but Rusany in between is under Ukrainian control. Not sure about the status of the M03 highway to Poltava, though.
There seem to be no major news from all the way from Chernihiv in the north, via Sumy, to Kharkiv – except that the Russians actually do not control anything at all in this part of Ukraine but their positions from about a week ago, and major roads. Kharkiv is still heavily shelled. Outside the city, fighting is going on in Bezruky and Mala Rohan, and, south-east of the city, in Petrivske and Izium.
EAST
In the Severodonetsk/Sievierodonetsk area, the Ukrainians have kicked the 3rd MRD out of Rubizhne and Popasna, and restored their defence line north-west and south-east of the city.
In the south-east, the defenders of Mariupol – that is: Marines, National Guard, and parts of the Azov Regiment – have not only turned down another of Russian offers to capitulate, but have restored all of their initial defence lines, except the one in the Livoberzhnyi District, in the east: the centre of the same is held by Ukrainians, but north and south by the Russians.
The VKS has bombed another building with a big shelter in Mariupol yesterday: this time the G12 Arts School, where about 400 civilians were taking shelter. It is known that the building was destroyed: the fate of those under the rubble remains unknown. Rescue parties can’t get there because of constant air strikes (somebody counted 1,400 so far), and artillery barrages.
Russians are continuing the deportation of population from areas captured by the RFA – foremost Azovstal and Ukrainian Cossacks Districts. People are brought to the territory controlled by the DPR, and their passports confiscated. Beyond that, I do not know what is happening to them, thus sorry: it’s pointless to ask me.
SOUTH
There’s a sort of ‘chaos’ in the Mykolaiv-Kherson area, as can be expected when one side is counterattacking, the other withdrawing, but launching local counterattacks, too. Essentially, the 58th CAA has abandoned the Mykolaiv Airport, which means the siege of the city is over. The frontline is now about 20-40km east of the city, roughly from Bashtanka in the north to Posad-Pokrovske in the south. ‘However’, the 58th CAA launched attacks towards north and took Kochubeivka and Zahradivka, perhaps even Mala Shestirnya, about 100km further north. Apparently, such an action is making next to no sense (which might be a confirmation that Zusko is not in command any more). However, one should keep in mind that the – much weakened – 58th CAA is now curious to buy time: to mine and booby-trap as much of the area north-west of Kherson, and thus slow-down the Ukrainian build-up for a counter-offensive.
For the end: AIR WAR, Part 4
In earlier instalments of this part of my analysis, I’ve described how the mass of the UkAF’s fleet of fighter-bombers, transports, and helicopters has evaded initial Russian blows, but also why the Ukrainian MiG-29- and Su-27-interceptors proved as ineffective.
I’ve also pointed out that the air strikes by UkAF Su-24s and Su-25s are largely ineffective – though haven’t found the time and space to explain exactly why. This is what I’m going to explain now.
The reason is that – once again: by all respect for the courage of Ukrainian combat pilots – operations by their interceptors and fighter-bombers are nowhere near as effective as operations by Turkish-made Bayraktar TB.2 UCAVs of the Ukrainian Air Force and Navy. Before the war, Ukraine acquired 12 of these, and placed an order for 24 additional examples. I’ll not go into details about how many were delivered or are currently operational: is a sensitive issue, and I also do not have ‘latest’ details. Sufficient to say the Russians were convinced there were only five (5) in Ukraine and they have shot down four with as many days of the war.
That much about news from some other planet.
By now it’s obvious that the GenStab fell for its own illusions regarding the RFA’s capability to counter such advanced UCAVs like the TB.2. So much so, it assigned the task to ground-based short-range air defence systems (SHORADs), like Pantsyr (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘SA-22 Greyhound), Tor (‘SA-15 Gauntlet’), and Buk (‘SA-17 Grizzly’), plus electronic-warfare systems, while leaving VKS’ interceptors entirely out of the game. It is perfectly possible that, on basis of experiences from Libya, Syria, and Azerbaijan of the last three years, the Turks have further refined their TB.2s. Whatever is the case, the net result is this:
– RFA actually has no effective counter-UCAV doctrine, and – for the first three weeks of this war – was surprisingly ineffective in countering TB.2s.
– Ukrainian TB.2-operators have exploited this opportunity to savage RFA’s forward-deployed SHORADs. Based on cross-examination of released videos and obituaries for fallen air-defence officers of the Russian Army, they seem to have obliterated about a dozen of Buk and Tor batteries, while Pantsyrs are as ineffective as they were already in Syria.
– This has left large portions of the RFA along three major frontlines de-facto defenceless against TB.2. See: 35th CAA west of Kyiv, 41st CAA and 2nd GTA/CAA east of Kyiv, and the 58th CAA in the Mykolaiv-Kherson area – with unsurprising results:
– once they were free of Russian air defences, the Ukrainians went began deploying their TB.2s for their other two important tasks. For reconnaissance and for close-air-support. In the Kyiv area, they have mauled many of Russian armoured formations; in the south they have directed massive and precise artillery barrages on the Kherson airport and the RFA units besieging Mykolaiv – with unavoidable (and undisputable) consequences.
– On top of this, by now it’s certain that the TB.2s have tracked down and precisely hit at least the field HQs of the 35th CAA in the North, plus numerous field-HQs of different of RFA’s battalion-tactical-groups, and several electronic warfare systems.
– Atop of physical damage they are causing, TB.2s are also wrecking the Russian nerves: we’ve seen several videos shown entire Russian BTGs turning around and fleeing after losing only a few vehicles to TB.2s (or to other means, thanks to TB.2-support).
With other words: a ‘far smaller number’ of TB.2s in Ukrainian service has achieved ‘far more’ than all the Su-24s, Su-25s, MiG-29s, and Su-27 – combined.
How is this possible?
Crucial capability of the TB.2 is its loitering capability. It can remain airborne for about 24 hours; alternatively, it has a range of 3,000km at optimum speed. At least as important is its capability to fly slow: if the wind is optimal, the operator can turn it ‘into the wind’. The wind is then providing the uplift necessary to keep it airborne while the UCAV is, de-facto, ‘hoovering’, i.e. has next to no speed over the ground.
Why’s that as important? Because of the TB.2 has a low radar-cross-section, because it’s relatively silent and emitting very little infra-red emissions, the Russian have immense problems just with detecting them, not to talk about tracking them. Furthermore, one should keep in mind that, while most of the Ukrainian terrain is flat, there are low hills, there are forests, and there are buildings that are disturbing the Russian radar picture. I.e. there are means for TB.2s to approach target zones entirely unobserved. They can be deployed anywhere, and approach from any direction, and there is no way for the Russians to find them all the time in the vast Ukrainian airspace (not even if they would grow 20 eyes on the heads of their troops).
Atop of that, the TB.2 is using satellite communications with directional antennas: they’re extremely hard to jam (except the source of jamming is very close and very powerful). In the West, most of SHORADs have a combination of computers and integrated electro-optical sensors that can ‘automatically’ verify what’s a ‘bird’ and what a UCAV. The Russians simply lack such high-tech.
Unsurprisingly, while claiming to have shot down over 120+ Ukrainian UAVs over the first three weeks of the war – including four Bayraktars in the first week – the Russians have so far proved unable to show the wreckage of more than one (in digits: 1) Ukrainian TB.2.
This is why I say: forget trying to get MiG-29s from Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia etc…. that’s too complex, too obvious, politically ‘touchy’, and entirely pointless. Stuff Ukraine full of TB.2s or UCAVs with comparable capabilities: send them loitering PGMs etc. This is what ‘works’: this is what’s causing massive damage to the Russians, this is what is wrecking their nerves and morale, and – even if in long term – causing irrecoverable casualties and physical damage.
