The geopolitical context of Israel’s survival struggle
The idea that Ukraine should orient itself towards Israel for its own security in the future is quite popular among certain segments of Ukrainian society. Against the backdrop of strategic uncertainty regarding the real prospects of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, alternative proposals emerge. The notion is that Ukraine could attempt to become a kind of second Israel. In that case, membership in the North Atlantic Alliance would lose its relevance. Such considerations, at first glance, seem logical and rational. However, a deeper analysis raises doubts about the appropriateness of Ukraine copying Israel’s experience in the struggle for survival.
In Israel, as in Ukraine, there have always been enemies seeking to eliminate its statehood. Just one day after declaring independence in 1948, Israel was forced to repel armed aggression. A coalition of Arab countries, including all the neighbors of the newly established Jewish state, launched invasions from multiple directions. The Arabs aimed to destroy the independent state of Israel. It seemed that the country would quickly lose its sovereignty. However, Jews had already started forming militarized units well before declaring independence, which later grew into an army. They already had experience in military operations and acted decisively. While there was a lack of coordination, mutual trust, and military skills within the Arab coalition, Israel’s personnel quality and better organization triumphed over quantity. Israel managed to preserve its sovereignty at a time when the danger was most imminent.
During the second half of the 20th century, conflicts between Israel and Arab countries resulted in multiple wars. In these military conflicts, Jews were no longer solely in the role of defending themselves. Despite the fact that several states fought against Israel, it not only managed to repel their attacks but also achieved victories and captured new territories. The Six-Day War of 1967 demonstrated the significant technological and strategic advantage of official Jerusalem. In a matter of days, Israel completely defeated the military and air forces of its adversaries, gaining control over the entire Palestinian territory, including the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Golan Heights in Syria, and the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt.
In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the coalition of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan failed to avenge the defeat of 1967. Despite initial setbacks and surprise attacks, the Israelis quickly recovered, made changes in leadership and military strategy, and shifted from defensive operations to counterattacks. By the end of the conflict, the Israeli army was within 100 km of the Egyptian capital and 40 km from the Syrian capital. The Arabs faced defeat once again.
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The Yom Kippur War marked the last major war between the Jewish state and the coalition of Arab countries. Subsequent military conflicts involving Israel were of significantly smaller scale in terms of combat operations and participants. Moreover, Jews no longer faced individual states with professional armies; they mainly dealt with terrorist groups backed by active external support. These conflicts often resulted in bloodshed and casualties among civilians. However, Israel’s question of preserving its statehood was no longer in doubt. Rather, the focus shifted to defending the country and its population from terrorist group attacks and various proxy forces.
A comparative analysis of threats: Israel and Ukraine
Drawing parallels between Ukraine and contemporary Israel requires an understanding of the fundamental difference in the situations of these two states. The hostile Arab coalition against Israel has long disappeared. It all began with a peaceful agreement between Egypt and Israel, signed in Washington in 1979. Official Cairo recognized the right of the Jewish state to exist and established diplomatic relations with it. The strongest Arab country at that time in terms of military power ceased to pose a threat to Israel. In 1994, it was Jordan’s turn, which also signed a peace treaty with official Jerusalem. In the same year, the Palestinian Authority was formed. As a result, the level of national threats to the existence of the Jewish state significantly decreased. While Israel once fought against regular armies on multiple fronts, it now faces various radical Arab armed formations like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad. Most of Israel’s current adversaries lack modern weapons. What they have is often homemade or obtained illegally. If parallels are drawn with Ukraine, the danger posed by these armed structures is roughly analogous to the terrorist formations of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. It in no way compares to the level of the Russian threat.
On the other hand, the relations between Ukraine and Russia are quite different. Moscow has never limited itself to mere threats and verbal denial of the existence of an independent Ukraine. Instead, the Kremlin has repeatedly engaged in military aggression against Ukraine. It orchestrated the genocide of the Ukrainian nation in the 20th century and pursued policies of colonization and Russification aimed at eradicating Ukrainian identity. Moscow rulers have been regularly afflicted with Ukrainophobia since the mid-17th century, denying Ukraine’s right to be independent, and this policy is supported by the majority of Russians.
Despite Iran’s significant military strength, comparing it to Russia is inappropriate. In 2022, Israel’s military budget exceeded 23 billion US dollars. Its powerful high-tech military allows Israel to claim the status of a regional leader. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Iran, which also seeks to play geopolitical games, allocated only 6.8 billion dollars to the military sphere. Currently, it is not Iran but Israel — a potential target of attack that possesses nuclear weapons, although it does not advertise this fact. Additionally, despite its small size, the Jewish state has a considerably stronger economy. In 2022, Israel’s GDP was around 522 billion dollars, while Iran’s was 388 billion dollars.
A completely different picture emerges when comparing the potentials of Ukraine and Russia, and unfortunately, it is not in Ukraine’s favor. In 2022, Russia’s military budget exceeded 86 billion dollars, while Ukraine’s was 44 billion. It’s worth remembering that the large-scale financing of the Ukrainian defense sector in the previous year was a result of foreign aid. Even before the war, the budget for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the 2022 state budget was allocated ten times less. Economically, Ukraine is also significantly lagging behind the aggressor. According to the World Bank’s assessment, Russia’s GDP in 2022 was 2.24 trillion dollars compared to Ukraine’s 160 billion dollars. Moreover, Russia possesses nuclear weapons and shares an extensive border with Ukraine.
Ukraine and Israel currently find themselves in fundamentally different geopolitical positions. The main challenges to national security for both states are fundamentally distinct. The enemies of Israel and Ukraine are not identical. On the contrary, they belong to different weight categories, possess different military capabilities, and have varying economic capacities. Perhaps if Israel had an aggressive empire like Russia with nuclear weapons on its border, Israel would be very interested in joining NATO. Therefore, the Israeli experience of existence in an unfavorable and aggressive external environment is undoubtedly valuable. However, it only partially applies to contemporary Ukraine.
Originally posted by Petro Herasymenko on Zaxid.net. Translated and edited by the UaPosition – Ukrainian news and analytics website
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