15 years ago, Russia, for the first time in its recent history, attacked a recognized sovereign state.
The war with Georgia lasted only a few days, but significantly impacted the future history of Europe.
In particular, the assertion that the world’s toothless reaction both to the aggression against Georgia and the Kremlin’s demonstrative disregard of the terms of the peace agreement (instead of withdrawing its forces from Georgian territory, the Russian authorities proceeded with the de facto annexation of parts of it, framing it as recognizing their “independence”) enabled Russia’s subsequent aggressive policies: the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
To no lesser extent, this war also transformed Georgia.
Although during the hostilities, the Georgian opposition demonstratively refrained from criticizing the government, the question of responsibility for the war divided Georgian politicians after its conclusion.
Even though President Mikheil Saakashvili managed to hold onto power after the military defeat, in 2012, the parliamentary elections were won by the Georgian Dream party, and this victory was largely achieved through criticism of Saakashvili for allowing the war to happen.
This theme has resurfaced in the rhetoric of the current Georgian government in recent years, just as the ratings of the Georgian Dream party began to decline.
And now, something incredible is happening — the topic of the 2008 war is actively being used by the authorities to legitimize a geopolitical shift away from the West towards Russia.
A date that divides
“Today, we honor the bright memory of our heroic soldiers and military personnel who perished in the war. The government is committed to the idea of a peaceful restoration of territorial integrity and the reunification of the country. We are guided by an unwavering belief that a peaceful, united, strong, and developed Georgia is the best perspective for Georgians, Ossetians, Abkhazians, and all those living in our country, and we are doing everything to bring this to life,” says the statement from August 8 by the Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Garibashvili.
This statement is indicative in at least two aspects.
Firstly, the head of the Georgian government only mentions the name of the aggressor country once. Instead, a significant portion of his statement addresses the responsibility for the events of the previous government and former President Saakashvili personally.
“We have repeatedly stated that this war could have been avoided… I want to emphasize once again that the former commander-in-chief showed great irresponsibility against the backdrop of the immense heroism and self-sacrifice of our heroic soldiers. Many examples of heroism were presented to our nation and future generations. Yet, we also witnessed the disgrace of the former commander-in-chief. You remember how he fell to the ground at the sound of the plane,” asserts Garibashvili.
The second point — the date of this statement. For many years, Georgia argued that the start of the war was not August 8 (as claimed by Russia), but August 7 — the day when Russian troops were introduced onto Georgian territory and began shelling villages along the demarcation line with the non-occupied territory.
This position is shared by many countries. It is not coincidental that statements from EU countries, the USA, and Ukraine regarding the 15th anniversary of the war were released precisely on August 7.
However, the current Georgian government demonstratively ignores this and considers August 8 as the start of the war — just like they do in the Kremlin.
For Georgia, this is quite illustrative.
And it indicates that the issue of a 15-year-old war still influences Georgia’s politics.
Recently, this topic has become an important tool for explaining the worsening relations with the West and simultaneous rapprochement with the aggressor country.
The demand for a “second front”
“Do you want it to be like in Ukraine?” “Do you want Batumi to become the same as Mariupol?”
These are common arguments from representatives of the Georgian government in recent months, with which they explain their decision to stay out of the Russian-Ukrainian war, including their refusal to impose sanctions against Russia.
However, the use of the societal trauma from the 2008 war for political purposes doesn’t solely end there.
Another very significant assertion of the current Georgian government is that the West supposedly demands Georgia to “open a second front” in the war against Russia.
Despite the fact that no Western politicians have made such statements (and Ukrainian calls came not from top officials of the state), the mass propaganda is yielding results. A considerable portion of Georgian Dream party’s supporters has come to believe or has been persuaded that the current issues in Georgia’s relations with the European Union are not linked to the country’s departure from democracy, but rather to an unwillingness to engage in a new war with Russia.
It is likely that the problems in relations with the EU will continue to escalate.
By the end of the year, the European Commission is expected to release a report on Tbilisi’s progress in completing the necessary tasks for attaining candidate status within the European Union. Considering the trend in accomplishing these tasks, the conclusions of this report are likely to be discouraging.
A refusal from Brussels could incite anti-government protests within Georgian society. This is because over 80% of Georgia’s citizens see EU and NATO membership as the best path for their country. Yet, instead of progressing, Georgia has been unable to overcome the initial barriers that Ukraine and Moldova have successfully navigated.
In such a scenario, the Georgian government is compelled to justify itself by claiming that all the necessary reforms in Tbilisi have indeed been implemented. The rejection from the European Commission, according to them, stems from other reasons, insinuating thereby the current policy of non-interference and reluctance to support Ukraine.
It is notable that the Georgian government has at least one ally in the EU who supports these assertions. This is Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. He has repeatedly stated that he considers Georgia to be a frontrunner in implementing European reforms. In response, the Georgian government asserts that it is learning from the “democratic processes” in Orbán’s Hungary.
A shift towards Russia
Throughout the past year, Russian propaganda did not hesitate to praise the Georgian government for its “balanced and independent” foreign policy.
However, in recent months, it’s become evident that Georgia is not merely attempting to stay on the sidelines of the European conflict, but is also increasingly moving towards rapprochement with Russia.
Moscow and Tbilisi are restoring air connections, and on the Russian side, flights to Georgia are operated by airlines that are under Ukrainian sanctions for flights to the occupied Crimea.
Russia is lifting certain trade restrictions against Georgian exports and subsequently reinstating visa-free status for Georgian citizens.
The Georgian government is attempting to adopt a law on foreign agents, modeled after the Russian version. However, following extensive protests, they have been compelled to abandon this plan — at least temporarily.
The latest scandal involved the halting of a passenger liner in Batumi, which had Russian passengers on board, including Putin’s propagandists and individuals who violated Georgian laws.
The Georgian authorities conspicuously turn a blind eye to such violations and accuse those who protest of harming the national economy, which is reliant on revenues from Russia.
Most likely, the anticipated deterioration of relations with the EU will lead to a new rapprochement with Russia. A potential step in this direction could be the launch of a freight railway connection between Russia and Georgia, passing through the territory of occupied Abkhazia.
Even more telling are the assertions actively propagated in Georgia by both openly pro-Russian activists (who were almost nonexistent in Georgia until recently but are now rapidly increasing in number) and pro-government bots.
Within Georgian society, the notion is being promoted that in response to Tbilisi’s pro-Russian policies, the Kremlin might agree to the return of occupied territories. Supposedly, this would be the only chance for these lands to be reclaimed without bloodshed.
Of course, such a scenario appears entirely utopian.
Recent history offers no examples of Russia willingly relinquishing something it has already seized.
And the current pro-Russian course of Tbilisi has failed to even halt the process of borderization — the gradual shifting of the demarcation line with the occupied territories, which results in Russia “biting off” new and new pieces of Georgian territory.
Despite these arguments, the idea of a possible compromise with Russia and the peaceful return of the occupied territories is actively promoted within society and will evidently resonate with a portion of voters with uncritical thinking.
So, no matter how absurd it may seem, the fear of a new war with Russia, amplified by references to the events of 2008, only pushes Georgia towards the aggressor country. The ongoing protests across the country in response to the government’s recent pro-Russian moves evidently are insufficient to halt this drift.
At present, the Georgian opposition is betting that a definitive rejection from the EU should mobilize citizens for much larger-scale protests.
However, it appears that the Georgian government is prepared for such a turn of events. It will defend itself by invoking the events of the 2008 war.
Originally posted by Yurii Panchenko on European Pravda. Translated and edited by the UaPosition – Ukrainian news and analytics website
