Discontent among Russian soldiers and officers
The foundation of Putin’s system held up after Prigozhin’s “weekend coup attempt,” but it is gradually being undermined by hundreds and thousands of micro-cracks. Now, new defects in the Russian political system have become known, thanks to the Russian military.
Former commander of the 58th Army and State Duma deputy, Andrey Gurulyov, addressed the soldiers of the former commander of the 58th Army, Major General Ivan Popov, who explained the reasons for his dismissal. As it turned out, the major general spoke to the “senior command” about problems in the army. According to Russian Telegram channels, after this, Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, accused Popov of panic and blackmail, and consequently, “treacherously and despicably beheaded the army.”
The Institute for the Study of War asserts that, in addition to Popov, the commander of the 106th Airborne Division, Major General Vladimir Selyverstov, the commander of the 7th Air Assault Division, Major General Alexander Kornev, the commander of the 90th Tank Division, Major General Ramil Ibatullin, and other senior officers of the Russian army were also dismissed for insubordination.
Following these decisions by the military leadership of Russia, soldiers of the 7th Air Assault Division made a video appeal, pledging their loyalty to the commander of the unified group of Russian forces in Ukraine, Major General Mikhail Teplinsky, who has had longstanding conflicts with both Shoigu and Gerasimov. The paratroopers threatened to leave the front and stand against anyone who poses a threat to the life and freedom of their “beloved General Teplinsky.”
Putin’s system under pressure
Well, the public accusations against Shoigu and Gerasimov began with Yevgeny Prigozhin. Of course, what is happening is not a rebellion but rather a demonstration of high-level dissatisfaction with Shoigu and Gerasimov among Russian soldiers and officers. This dissatisfaction arises in the context of bitterness over failures on the front, which leads to mistrust towards the higher military leadership. This further complicates the attempts of the Minister and the Chief of the General Staff to “cleanse” the army that is at war from disloyal commanders.
However, the growing discontent among officers poses a potential danger to Putin’s personal power: the ghost of February 1917 wanders through Russia, frightening those in power and the zealous patriots. Mistrust towards the higher command can easily turn into a loss of trust in the political leadership.
See also: Could Prigozhin “take Moscow” at all: what forces are needed to control a 12-million metropolis?
“The appeal of the dismissed commander to the public is nonsense, a scandal, an extremely dangerous precedent in a regular army. It’s almost a coup. Moreover, this time it was not some criminal who, by a stroke of luck, became a lord from a boor but a genuine career general (and not one of the worst). As many commentators rightly point out, this can only lead to coups and uncontrolled disintegration of the army,” writes Colonel of the FSB and war criminal Igor Strelkov (Girkin).
Since 1999, Putin has carefully built a mechanism of balance between the Kremlin towers, business groups, and Russian security structures. However, in recent years, the Russian president has played a diminishing role as an arbiter in the conflict between Prigozhin and Shoigu and Gerasimov and has self-excluded himself. This has become one of the reasons for the rebellion. As it turns out, the system he built actually responds poorly to crises, as evidenced by the Wagner crash-test.
Prigozhin’s coup revealed systemic problems in Russia, which have raised suspicions in the West and Ukraine since February 24. Putin demonstrated weakness, and the regime showed that it is not all-powerful due to its weak management and decision-making system, a weak army, and negative selection of elites. The Overton window has shifted. However, while Kyiv and Warsaw may have seen new opportunities in the “weekend coup attempt,” Washington, Berlin, and Paris face new risks.
The political turbulence in Russia is currently high. It is possible that the situation will stabilize for a certain period, and then we will find out the answer to one of the questions that remained in the air after Prigozhin’s coup: will Putin’s regime be able to conduct purges among the security forces? The unclear status of the commander of the Aerospace Forces, Army General Sergei Surovikin, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, and other generals, who are either under arrest or on “leave” due to suspicion of supporting the Wagner group during the coup, demonstrates the Kremlin’s confusion.
A number of experts believe that the regime feels too weak to allow itself to carry out repressions.
“To conduct an elite purge now means meeting the demands of the rebels,” notes Alexander Baunov, an associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
However, this does not negate Putin’s readiness to strengthen the regime. Currently, to reinforce the authority of the president, undermined by the “March of Justice,” the Russian leadership intends not only to exit the “grain deal.”
Fearing a new coup and conspiracy, Putin is now attempting to stabilize the political system by seeking to strengthen the loyalty of the nomenklatura and representatives of big business while building a new balance of restraints and counterbalances. Already at this stage, it is evident that by restructuring the system, Putin is bolstering the position of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya) within the security structures in opposition to the FSB, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Internal Affairs — actions of its commander, Viktor Zolotov, are currently on the rise.
Strengthening the regime amid political turbulence
The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya) is being strengthened, firstly, by transferring military equipment (including heavy equipment) and weapons to the “Vova’s” unit, which involves amending the On the National Guard law. Secondly, by transferring the Grom special forces unit to Rosgvardiya, which is the last remaining force resource of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thirdly, by expanding its operational capabilities: there are active lobbying efforts in the State Duma to grant Rosgvardiya the right to second its personnel to private and state-owned companies.
As for the Russian elite, the Kremlin is doing its utmost to prevent the details of internal Kremlin struggles from penetrating into the public space. Since the crisis is ongoing, the consequences of Prigozhin’s coup for Putin’s inner circle, the nomenklatura, and representatives of big business remain unclear. Russian Telegram channels only mention that significant personnel reshuffles are being prepared for the autumn. Only then will it become apparent which Kremlin tower benefited from the “March of Justice.”
Already now, based on several indications, it can be determined that Prigozhin’s coup has dealt a significant blow to the positions of the Kovalchuk brothers and Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Sergey Kiriyenko. They were the major shareholders of the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) and Prigozhin’s project, while Igor Sechin was a minority shareholder. Currently, they still have ties to Putin. If Kiriyenko leaves his position, it will be a sign that the security forces have convinced Putin that the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration and his patron were associated with Prigozhin.
At present, the coup has triggered changes in the management of Russian media outlets. In particular, control over the information sphere is being transferred from the Kovalchuk-Kiriyenko group to the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Alexey Gromov. After Prigozhin’s coup, Sergey Mikhailov, the CEO of TASS agency, who is linked to Yury Kovalchuk, was removed due to failures in information work. He was replaced by Gromov’s ally, Andrey Kondrashov. Moreover, there is active discussion about the possibility that Gromov will take partial control of Prigozhin’s media group Patriot.
Among those who lost is the Shoigu group. He remains at the helm of the Ministry of Defense and is even conducting mass purges among the senior command, removing military leaders who made critical remarks. However, considering everything, his fate has been decided, and in a few months as part of a “personnel package,” he will be sent by the President’s representative to one of the Russian regions. As for his potential successor, it is unknown: the Governor of Tula, Dyumin, who was recently predicted to become the Minister of Defense, could very well become a new Deputy Prime Minister responsible for defense.
On the other hand, among those who emerged as winners is the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, who demonstrated crisis management skills, along with Dyumin “settling” the Wagner PMC revolt. Also benefiting from the coup is the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov. Among the beneficiaries of the coup is Prigozhin himself. He raised the stakes to a dangerous level, but it is not yet apparent that the “chef” has lost: he is still alive, retains a portion of his business, and even met with Putin. Currently, he is negotiating the number of Wagner PMC members in Belarus and their terms of stay there.
Although microfractures are increasing, gradually eroding Putin’s system, there is no visible split within the Russian elite. Currently, it is advantageous for the elite to keep Putin in power, so it maintains loyalty towards him. For now, the risks of losing its positions under the current Kremlin leader outweigh the risks associated with his continued rule. However, Prigozhin’s coup and the openly expressed dissatisfaction by Russian servicemen with the military leadership illustrate that, as noted by the UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace, “Russia is much more fragile than Russians want to admit.”
Originally posted by Volodymyr Kravchenko on Zn.ua. Translated and edited by the UaPosition – Ukrainian news and analytics website
See also: Wagner is already in Belarus: who is in greater danger?
