Polish politician Radosław Sikorski, in an interview with Espreso TV channel, expressed the opinion that the Russian dictator Putin should come to the conclusion (with the help of the international community) about the threat to his power due to the prolongation of the so-called special military operation. He recounted how he personally witnessed the effective use of Polish howitzers Krab in Donbas and why certain statements of Russian opposition figures should be taken into consideration.
Radosław Sikorski is a Polish politician, public figure, former Minister of Defense of Poland (2005-2007), and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland (2007-2014). He is referred to as a friend of Ukraine and a volunteer.
Mr. Radosław, you returned from Ukraine not long ago, being here as a volunteer. Where exactly were you and what are your impressions of what you saw in Ukraine?
I was with a convoy of pickup trucks for the third time, led by Mateusz Wodziński, who has already delivered over 120 cars to Ukraine. This time, I organized a fundraiser among family and friends. We managed to gather just under $200,000, and with this money, we will have a dozen pickups and two dozen drones. Last week, we brought seven of them. First, we drove to Kyiv, then to Kharkiv, and from Kharkiv to Chasiv Yar, one team went, while another went to the front lines to the 26th Artillery Brigade, which operates the Polish Krab self-propelled howitzers using American ammunition. The vehicles were handed over directly to the military on the front lines, and a pleasant surprise was that among them was a Polish volunteer medic. Therefore, one of the pickups will be used for transporting the wounded. We also brought a certain number of drones for the front from Kyiv to Kharkiv. I hope that all of this will contribute to the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Thank you very much. But why are you going? This trip is not safe.
People in the West think it’s riskier than it actually is. An argument that convinced them was that this time, two donors took part in the trip, and I convinced them that on the way back in the Lviv area, I was given permission to exceed the speed limit. So, we decided that since we have permits, it must be safe.
It’s all like in the European Union. Can you share your impressions of what you’ve seen? Were you all the way to Bakhmut?
Yes, all the way to Kramatorsk. You can feel the war there, hear artillery shelling. And we know that the Ukrainian army is trying to encircle Bakhmut, and gain fire control over Russians. It seems to me a very intelligent operation. Initially, Russians are tasked with significant losses for taking a non-key city, and now depriving them of the gains from that conquest and complicating their logistics. In my opinion, it’s an operation being conducted wisely.
And what did you tell your fellow countrymen after this trip? What do your acquaintances, friends, and politicians you talk to, possibly in the EU, say about the war in Ukraine? Is there an impression that some of them would like this war to end already?
We all wish for this war to end, but the question is under what conditions.
Exactly.
It cannot be the case that Putin will conclude it with territorial gains and success. I hope it will end when Ukraine regains its lands. From that mission, I have the following thoughts. Firstly, the 26th Artillery Brigade had very positive feedback about the Polish howitzers Krab. It warms my heart to know that Polish weaponry is proving useful, and there are quite a number of them there. I don’t know if I can speak precisely about the quantity, but it’s in the tens of vehicles. They fire American precision-guided munitions like the Excalibur with a range of 40 km and an accuracy of up to 1 meter. In my opinion, it’s something like 10-20, or maybe even 50 times better than regular munitions. So, I’m very glad that Ukraine has such weapons and I’m also pleased that they are partially from Poland. What I’m concerned about is whether we provided Ukraine with enough equipment to break through the Russian defensive lines in the south. It’s the right direction for advancement; Ukraine should reach the Azov Sea because it would divide Russian occupation logistically into two parts, or at least intercept the road along the sea coast. And even more importantly — disrupt the railway connection, as Russia conducts its logistic operations by rail. I hope that in our cooperation with Ukraine, it’s Ukraine itself that makes military decisions based on military logic rather than following some political calendar from the West. It must be extremely challenging for the Ukrainian military to operate without air superiority and in a situation where, unfortunately, we’ve given Russians half a year to fortify and establish defensive lines, so the element of surprise is absent. I believe Putin is preparing for a protracted war. And in the West, we must also be prepared to support Ukraine for an extended period until results are achieved.
You mentioned aviation. Why does the discussion about providing Ukrainians with F-16s take so long? Currently, they are talking about training Ukrainian military personnel so that they can operate the fighter jets. But there is no final result yet when the start date for training Ukrainian pilots will be determined (after the interview recording, President Zelenskyy announced that F-16 training will start in August).
Let’s remember that at the beginning of the war, they didn’t even want to give Ukraine long-range anti-aircraft weapons. And let’s remember that it’s a significant failure for Russia that it does have air superiority over Ukraine. This happened due to supplies from the West, including Poland, of effective anti-aircraft defense missiles — first of short-range and now long-range. When I was in Kharkiv on Wednesday, there were reports of 3 or 7 drones flying towards Kharkiv. And from what I know, they were all shot down. So, in terms of defending Ukrainian territory, things aren’t bad, even though we know that people are still dying. But in terms of supporting Ukrainian forces on the front lines during the offensive, more needs to be done. The West has long thought that Putin would back out due to an obvious mistake in this war. And it seems to me that only gradually they starting to realize that Putin has the same goals in the war as he had before. And the fact that Russia has shifted its economy to a wartime footing means that we should do the same. It’s starting to happen, but very slowly.
You mentioned that Putin doesn’t want to end this war. What is his current strategy?
I was in Washington two weeks ago, where they monitor these matters closely. As it turns out, the US intelligence sources regarding Russian plans and actions are very good. Many times, especially at the beginning of the war, they managed to use this intelligence strategically. Americans are convinced that a massive portion of Russia’s budget is now devoted to military expenditures, and yet Russia still hasn’t been able to make significant progress. This is a significant compromise for Russia, but we know that the country has certain means. It exports energy resources and obtains some supplies through third countries. Putin can hope that with a fourfold numerical advantage, he can eventually wear down Ukraine. And by providing Ukraine with advantages in terms of weapons, we must ultimately convince Russian elites that they cannot win this war because only then will serious negotiations begin.
Is there anyone to talk to in Russia? Among those elites you mentioned.
For now, Putin maintains control, so he needs to be convinced. If he decides to engage in serious discussions about a resolution, about ending the war, there will be no shortage of intermediaries — whether it’s Turkey, China, or the UN, there are willing parties.
Only if Putin wants to end the war, but it seems that he has no such desire.
However, Putin will only want to end the war when he himself concludes that the invasion was a mistake, when he realizes that any benefits from re-subjugating Ukraine, from colonizing parts of Ukraine, are not worth the costs he’s already bearing. In most of these colonial wars, a completely different team achieves victory than the one that initiated it. In other words, Putin would have to come to the realization that continuing the war directly threatens his rule. Otherwise, he might face being replaced.
How much more time will it take for Putin to make such a decision?
This will depend on the level of Russian casualties and the morale of the Russian military, which, as we can see from the Prigozhin mutiny, is very low. The question is whether Russian soldiers will start doing what they did in 1919 when, instead of dying senselessly, they chose to refuse orders from their officers. There are some isolated reports, but it would have to be on a larger scale.
And is the world ready for the possibility of uprisings in Russia and Putin losing power?
Putin must lose his power and face the International Criminal Court. We know that this is being discussed in Russia. I don’t know if you noticed a statement that brought me some comfort — from Girkin-Strelkov before his arrest. He was asked if Putin would end up in The Hague. And the colonel, I must admit, quite sincerely said, “if we lose that war, and we will lose it,” I quote, “Navalny won’t be killed earlier,” I continue to quote, “but if Navalny becomes president, then Putin will be sent to The Hague.” I was surprised they even recorded that.
See also: The foundation is crumbling. Is Russia ready to remove Putin?
But Navalny then said that Girkin is a political prisoner. In Ukraine, this individual is considered a criminal and a terrorist.
One doesn’t negate another. However, what Navalny said from his imprisonment — that a future democratic Russia will unequivocally take back territory from Ukraine and pay reparations from future hydrocarbon export revenues — is something Ukraine should take into consideration. The fact that such discussions are taking place among Putin’s prisoners, the Russian diaspora, and parts of the Russian elite — this is a positive development, not a negative one. It’s good for an alternative Russian elite to have such a plan.
Prigozhin’s failed rebellion led to Wagner Group members being in Belarus now. Some of them are very close to the border with Poland. Is Poland worried? How does Polish society perceive the presence of representatives of a terrorist organization so close?
We’re de facto in the midst of an election campaign, so the government here is trying to create a sense of threat. However, I don’t think a few hundred or even a few thousand mercenaries pose a threat to Poland or NATO because this border isn’t only Poland’s but also the EU’s and NATO’s. Let me put it bluntly: if Putin can’t defeat Ukraine, he certainly won’t be able to defeat Poland and NATO. If the Wagner Group members cross the border, they’ll simply be eliminated.
You mentioned elections in Poland. Poland serves as an example of democracy and democratic development for Ukraine. However, this summer, Poles engaged in protests, perhaps the largest in recent years. Therefore, we can see that something is happening with democracy in Poland. Doesn’t this resemble the process of Orbanization?
I would rather liken this to what is happening in Israel, where protests are also taking place against the ruling party’s increased influence on the judiciary. Unfortunately, this has occurred in Poland as well — the military has become involved in the prosecutor’s office, the Constitutional Tribunal is currently somewhat in conflict and has come under the influence of the ruling party, attempting to politicize the appointment of judges. Due to this, Poland is in conflict with EU institutions and is not receiving hundreds of billions of zlotys from the national reconstruction plan. Therefore, I can tell the Ukrainian public that if there is a change of power in October or November, it will continue to support Ukraine just as strongly, while also mending its relationship with Brussels and Berlin. Then, Poland will become more influential within the EU, able to exert more influence on expediting negotiations between Ukraine and the European Union.
And why do Russians lately often repeat that Poland and Poles are helping Ukraine so much, only to then occupy Ukraine or at least Western Ukraine?
It’s done to provoke discord between Poles and Ukrainians. Putin has done this before. In 2009, in Gdansk, he hinted at Lviv: “And Lviv is a Polish city.” We ignored and rejected that. Later, Zhirinovsky sent me a letter — he was the deputy chairman of the Russian State Duma at the time with a de facto proposal, which we also rejected. This is an attempt to draw us into some dispute in the future. I don’t believe any Polish government would fall for this. I can’t say the same for all European countries, but Poland has learned from its history. You know, the miracle of European integration is based on German-French understanding. I partly work in Strasbourg, where the European Parliament is located. It was once a Roman fort on the Rhine, and for 2,000 years Strasbourg changed ownership between Germans and France. It’s surrounded by fortresses, battlefields, cemeteries. How many millions of people died to change that border, and it remained the same. And the Europeans, the French and the Germans, came to the conclusion that instead of fighting over that border, it’s better to integrate so that the border becomes irrelevant. I believe that we, Poles and Ukrainians, have also come to that conclusion. And this is a great value that needs to be protected and not allow manipulation with either past matters where blame lies on both sides, or any Putin-inspired intrigues. We won’t allow that.
And what about Polish society? Is it making fun of these Russian proposals?
That’s how it seems to me. Of course, there are still families who suffered during the Volyn tragedy, and I hope that matters of exhumation and honoring the memory will be resolved because they need to be addressed. And, of course, the fact that there are currently over a million refugees from Ukraine in Poland sometimes causes irritation, but it’s the task of politicians to explain, and it’s the task of our Ukrainian guests to minimize causes of irritation so that Ukraine receives as much support as possible, which is beneficial for both of our countries.
Recently, Polish football fans came to a match with a banner that read that Bandera is a criminal, and they also wrote things about the Ukrainian Insurgent Army that I cannot repeat on the air. What should we do about this? For Ukrainians, Bandera is a symbol of the struggle against Russia, the struggle for Ukraine, but not at all someone who did something to the Poles.
Actually, here we have a difference in perspectives but also a difference in education. That is, you need to explain that Bandera was simultaneously a leader of a formation, and I know he was in a German concentration camp at that time, but one of his deputies, whose name I can’t recall right now, gave the order to kill 100,000 Poles. 100,000 Poles, innocent people, in 1943. And I know that has its historical roots. What the Polish nobility did in the 17th and 18th centuries, and what Poland’s pre-war policy towards Ukrainians in Volyn was a policy of forced assimilation — and that it was a flawed policy, but 100,000 people died. And I know that a hero of one nation can be an oppressor to another. But great nations are capable of recognizing their mistakes. We try to explain that no one was without blame, and from your side, you also need to do the same.
We forgive and ask for forgiveness.
Our bishops made such a statement to the Germans in the 1960s. Back then, when the communist authorities were inciting Poles against Germans. Today, we have a government that is also inciting Poles against Germans, but it seems to me that it’s ineffective because most Poles, along with most Germans, cooperate well, and we must not allow populists to capitalize on historical misunderstandings. Because it won’t bring back any victim’s life, not a single one, but it can lead to new victims in the future.
Can Russia now, as Poland prepares for elections, again use these complex aspects of our shared history with Poland against Ukraine and Poland, as it has done before?
I can assume that it will do so. I remember 2011, during the Polish presidency of the EU, with great efforts, including mine personally, we finalized the text of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. And suddenly, a draft resolution appeared in the Polish Sejm that changed the attitude towards Volyn and the Volyn tragedy. Literally, just a couple of years before, the Polish Sejm adopted a resolution that it was a war crime with elements of genocide. And now suddenly, it should be outright genocide or a sharpening of the description. Ultimately, nothing has changed when it comes to the opinions of historians or the number of victims, but someone really wanted to ignite new hostility between Ukrainians and Poles. This is only beneficial for the enemies of both of our countries.
Originally posted by Lesya Vakulyuk on Espreso. Translated and edited by the UaPosition – Ukrainian news and analytics website
See also: The rise and fall of Putinocracy. How much of the future does the Kremlin’s master have?
