Russian political analyst in exile, Dmitry Oreshkin, in an interview with the host of the Studio West program, Antin Borkovsky, on the Espreso TV channel, discussed the strength of Putin’s regime and the prospects of a general uprising.
The Kremlin is preparing for a scenario of a long war. The scenario is not simple, and it involves a series of measures. But in any case, what Putin did by removing Prigozhin suggests that he is heading towards some kind of final stage. Fascism or the crystallization of the Reich is happening right before our eyes.
I’ll start with the fact that a long war is likely an empirical reality. And this alone means that the special military operation did not happen. A special military operation is a blitzkrieg carried out by specially trained individuals. The term “operation” itself implies precision, i.e., pinpoint impact — quickly capture Kyiv, quickly install their puppet there, and voila, clean hands. It didn’t work out that way. What happened is a heavy, bloody war, the likes of which Europe has not seen since 1945. Half a million casualties, several million refugees — with all the consequences. So, the war has entered a new phase, to put it plainly, and Putin certainly didn’t anticipate this. Although he continues to put on a confident facade and explains that everything is going according to plan — of course, everything is going according to plan, just as we thought.
Furthermore, the majority of Russians, intentionally ignoring the obvious, believe that Putin is defending them from aggression by Ukraine, NATO countries, and so on. In other words, public opinion in Russia has been turned upside down, and this is one of the peculiarities of Putin’s regime. This narrative works as long as there is a battlefield victory. In general, this is a Hitlerian concept, and Germans also applauded with their forelimbs and ears, especially in 1940 when there was a rapid, blitzkrieg-style victory, or special operation, over France. At that time, Hitler enjoyed overwhelming support. It took several years of war, defeat, and then several years of brainwashing for the German people to see the obvious. They didn’t see it because they didn’t want to see it — Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Salaspils, and the rest. They were not told about it, and they didn’t want to know.
A similar situation exists with the Russian people — they don’t want to know what’s happening in Ukraine. They don’t want to believe that Russian soldiers were killing innocent people in Bucha. Some people even say, “Russian soldiers couldn’t do such a thing.” For public and social structures to change their perspective drastically, a difficult and painful process usually associated with a material defeat on the battlefield must occur.
What happened in Pskov is just the beginning of sobriety. Well, there’s no real sobriety because the reaction is aggressive: “What are they doing to us?”
And why does Ukraine allow itself to strike the territory of Pskov? How is this possible?
How long will it take for the average Russian citizen to understand that war involves both sides? That there cannot be a war only in Ukraine, and that the war will return to Russian territory. So, how will they act? We had two scenarios: the first Russian-Chechen war and the second Russian-Chechen war. During the first Russian-Chechen war, maybe the Afghan syndrome worked when they realized that it needed to be ended. The second Russian-Chechen war was marked by Putin: finalization, crystallization.
If we’re talking about communicative memory and the time it takes to reconfigure it, I wouldn’t even consider this topic. Because in the Putin model of governance, public opinion is not a subject but an object. Not a political subject, but a political object. It is manipulated, and a certain worldview is poured into people’s minds through television. And until there is a change in leadership, public opinion will not change. Or this process will be unbearably long, measured in months, and maybe even years.
In reality, the discussion about the resilience of the Putin regime pertains mainly to the mood of the elites. The elites, firstly, are better informed, and secondly, they possess skills for independent information analysis simply because they have to make decisions both in peacetime and during war, and they are accountable for these decisions. Reevaluation can happen there, and it is already occurring in reality, and we see some indirect signs of it: some are leaving, while others, like Volozh, suddenly declare themselves to be Kazakh businessmen and renounce their Russian roots, and so on. These are elite citizens, and this is bad news for Putin.
Patrushev, Naryshkin, and Medvedev are showing quite the opposite scenario; it seems like they need to call in experts of the appropriate profile.
That’s true, but the thing is that Patrushev, Medvedev, and some others — they are not the entire Putin elite, they are just the ultra-patriotic part. Yes, they have a very high influence, but they can take money from the cash box. They don’t think and don’t know how to think about where the money in the cash box comes from. And money is needed to pay the soldiers, to buy weapons. Already, one-third of the Russian budget, approximately 10 trillion rubles, goes to the war. This cannot continue for long, obviously; living conditions will deteriorate — both for the population and for the same elites.
So, hidden grumbling and disappointment are taking place among the elites, from both sides. It’s clear that those who would like to see Russia as a European-oriented country have been pushed under the table; they remain silent, they are intimidated, and they follow the orders given by Putin.
But now, the main threat to Putin is precisely the ultra-patriots — loosely speaking, the people of the Prigozhin-Girkin plan, who are criticizing Putin for waging the war poorly. They argue that Ukraine should have been conquered a long time ago, the tricolor flag should have been raised over Kyiv, and Putin is weak — that’s the most interesting part. Therefore, Putin’s repression will now target the ultra-patriotic public. In this sense, it’s the elites who are experiencing a rupture in the established pattern.
So, in response to your question, in my opinion, depending on Ukraine’s success in carrying out strikes, especially on Russian territory, and in establishing a corridor to the Sea of Azov, the elites’ realization of the dead-end of the Putin regime will happen sooner or later. The faster, more significant, and more effective the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the sooner the elites in Russia will experience a breakdown, disappointment, and the formation of grievances against Putin.
As for public opinion, it sits with an open mouth in front of the television and generally doesn’t understand what is happening.
See also: How empires die: Putin’s Russia could cease to exist suddenly and quickly
After the killings of Prigozhin, Utkin, and several other fairly active figures potentially associated with Putin’s oprichnina, Putin is pursuing some other, possibly individual, scenario for himself.
The point is that Putin himself created this class of Oprichnik forces. And now, this class of Oprichniks, whether you call them janissaries, personal guards, or whatever, poses a threat to him. Because his logic is simple: he must control power. If he doesn’t control power, he’s weak, vulnerable, and destitute — anything can happen to him. His worst nightmare is Putin without power. Unlike Yeltsin, who wasn’t afraid to part with power, Putin can’t do it for psycho-physiological reasons. From the perspective of an outside observer, of course, he lost, of course, he’s a killer. Now it’s clear that he killed Prigozhin. Of course, he’s a cowardly killer, he killed out of fear. Of course, he initially spoke about coup, backstabbing, betrayal, and then started negotiating with Prigozhin, showing some weakness — of course, there’s a split in the consciousness of the Putin majority. But he controls his entire entourage, that’s true. Even though they grumble, get annoyed, argue among themselves, and exchange glances, none of them dare to say that it’s time for grandfather to retire. Unlike Prigozhin, who dared to say it.
So, in my opinion, Putin has retained power but lost several significant points of support within this ultra-patriotic community, which is not articulating this because it has no choice but to support Putin now. It understands that he’s not doing well at the moment and is showing weakness, and even Girkin is shouting about it.
But the individuals who actually possess governing resources — the generals, Putin’s security officials, Putin’s oligarchs prefer to remain silent because the stakes are too high.
However, within themselves, they realize that the peak of Putin’s power has passed. They don’t see an alternative, don’t know what to do, wait for cues, and exchange glances. But if you were to ask them, they would, of course, respond with statements like, “I fully support and share it,” “everything is going according to plan,” “everything is correct.” So, it will take a few more months before one of them dares to articulate something. And the more incidents like the one in Pskov occur, the faster the realization will progress among the upper echelons.
For the transit to be successful, they needed a figurehead they could put in place. But due to institutional procedures, most likely, Mishustin, the Prime Minister, would have to lead the transit, who, in case something happens when the leader “meets” with a tobacco pouch, is supposed to take charge of the Russian state.
You know, this is the main problem I’m currently trying to contemplate. Putin has destroyed trust in state institutions. In this sense, the Russian state has degraded to the level of a leader’s rule: there’s one chief — the leader, who is the source of legislative, executive, military, ideological, and all forms of authority in this country.
“One people, one leader.”
Exactly. This is degradation, and that’s why the mentioned person Mishustin no longer makes sense. Yes, there’s the Constitution, which states that in the event of the president’s death, incapacity, or departure, the prime minister takes on the president’s functions, prepares elections within three months, and then the next president is determined in the elections, which is absolutely normal for a rule of law.
But thanks to Putin, Russia hasn’t been a rule of law for a long time. That’s why they had to “settle things” with Prigozhin based on their own notions and get rid of him later when he was detached from direct force support.
Thus, all the Russian generals understand perfectly well that the Constitution is worthless.
No need for a complex scenario, no need for a theatrical performance a la Prigozhin — these operators have been dealing with such matters since Soviet times, and perhaps even earlier, dating back to the 18th century, and they always found shorter paths to resolution.
Put yourself in the shoes of any of these generals. Overthrowing is not even half the job, it’s just a third. What’s important is that you don’t get overthrown afterwards and that you retain that power. You might manage to reach the Tsar’s chamber with a tobacco pouch or a silk shawl. But if you haven’t reached an agreement beforehand with other members of the security apparatus, you’ll find yourself in the Kremlin surrounded by Zolotov’s Rosgvardia, and it will promptly take care of you and seize power. Do any of these generals need that? No, they don’t. Therefore, before killing, you need to secure military support, negotiate — Shoigu with Zolotov, Shoigu with someone like Surovikin, who is a genuine enemy of Shoigu, or with Bortnikov, or someone like Kadyrov. This is accompanied by a process of leaking information, and Putin’s regime relies on everyone reporting on each other. All these generals view each other as enemies. Yes, there are people they personally trust, but they are aware that among these people, there could well be agents of other security structures.
Putin has built a system of mutual restraint and counterbalance, where everyone reports on everyone else. After the Prigozhin’s coup attempt, Putin handed over heavy equipment to someone — who? — Zolotov, someone he personally trusts. Not just any equipment: internal troops or the Rosgvardia with heavy equipment. Why? To respond in case of a military coup. They won’t be stopping civilians with heavy equipment, that’s clear, but rather other soldiers.
That’s why I say — yes, the generals understand that something needs to be done. But as soon as one of them tries to organize something, it will end up like Prigozhin. At least, that’s a scenario they’re considering.
It’s clear that the Prigozhin negotiations were known to the security service — if the United States knew that Prigozhin was preparing for this, then certainly the Lubyanka knew as well. So they worked with Surovikin, and that’s why Surovikin refused to participate on the day of the coup attempt. Perhaps he regrets it now because he had a chance then to retain influence, but now he’s worthless at best.
While regularly studying Medvedev’s correspondence, I came across a rather alarming moment: it concerns the formation of an attack on Ukraine as an existential war for the Kremlin. Their key task is to sell this to Russia’s conscripted citizens, framing an attack on Ukraine as a necessity for survival. This means they will market it as a patriotic war.
Nothing strange about it; Medvedev has long been trying to present this war as a patriotic one. However, it doesn’t work because people perceive the war as they would a hockey game on TV. All of Putin’s propaganda was based on the idea that it doesn’t concern you, you’re living well, guys, your salaries have even gone up because they’re paying more to those they’ve taken into the army, life is getting better, you’ve risen from your knees — in short, watch TV and have a beer.
A patriotic war, on the other hand, is when someone attacks us. Medvedev is virtually trying to depict it as a patriotic war. But in practice, the majority of Putin’s supporters are detached. Moreover, as soon as they feel the damage in their own lives, they’ll start expressing dissatisfaction. Right now, it’s like the Roman plebs demanding bread and circuses. Putin provides both bread and circuses. For them, the war in Ukraine is just a spectacle.
However, when this war, this bloodshed, starts intruding into their personal lives from the TV screen, they consider it a breach of the rules. In Pskov’s online communities, after the strike on the Pskov airbase, reactions of surprise and offense prevailed, at least as it appeared to me (I visited those communities at the time). They were asking, “Why us? What did we do for this?” The war is happening somewhere else; it’s NATO, someone else’s problem, so why here in Pskov? That’s not according to the rules! We were supposed to win, and without paying for it. Such a peculiar narrative resides in the minds of Putin’s majority.
Medvedev is talking to them about a patriotic war. No, as long as there’s no invasion within Russia’s borders and they don’t reach Voronezh or Moscow, the idea of a patriotic war will remain dead.
No patriotic war resonates with them; Medvedev has been dwelling on this theme unnecessarily for the past year and a half. He doesn’t have any cards to play in this political game; he’s just a talking head trying to boost his significance by speaking louder and more aggressively. He’s an empty vessel; he has no political resources left — Putin holds all the political resources. That’s why it’s sad to watch Medvedev, and that’s how Putin looks at him too: a small dog until old age is a puppy, let him run ahead of the locomotive and bark louder. That’s the whole story.
If we look at the next quarter, in your view, will Putin escalate the situation or, conversely, try to keep it at the same level, perhaps with the aim of entering negotiations?
I believe that Putin has already entered a zone where he has lost the freedom to choose. He has chosen a trajectory that has led him into a dead end, and now he is simply doomed to hope for escalation. It’s not at all unlikely that through backchannels, he will be probing the ground, thinking about how to retreat. He’s not a fool; he understands that the scenario has not gone as planned.
Therefore, in practical terms, he will intimidate the West, primarily by delivering increasingly bloody blows to Ukraine because he needs to show a victory, but at night, he will be thinking with horror that there is no victory.
Accordingly, he probably assigns some of his players, or they themselves begin to look for ways to exit this crisis situation with a triumphant expression on their faces. This is very important — with a triumphant expression on their faces. Until he feels the opportunity for an exit with this triumphant expression, he will continue to paint this victorious expression on television. In fact, the hysterical “victorious” or “victorious-to-be” rhetoric in the media in recent days, I think, has intensified, as evidenced by Medvedev’s repetitions about it.
Putin is, in my opinion, doomed to intensify the military component in the coming weeks or months. But at the same time, in his nightmares, he ponders how to get out of this situation if Ukraine doesn’t get scared and if the West doesn’t get scared. The hope that they will get scared is growing weaker and more illusory, but there is nothing more to hope for. So, my answer is escalation.
Originally posted by Antin Borkovsky on Espreso. Translated and edited by the UaPosition – Ukrainian news and analytics website
