Do you know what combat-ready means? Combat-ready at this moment. In contrast to combat-ready — there is not combat-ready at this moment. This applies to people, equipment, and weapons.
Currently, I observe a very unhealthy trend in the army regarding personnel — negative selection. The so-called HR in the army is focused on negative selection. As a result, the combat-ready of the army is gradually decreasing, although it should be the opposite. Why is that?
First, the ineffective work of draft boards
The full-scale war has been going on for 15 months. Successful operations have provided the opportunity and time to prepare mobilization reserves. There are people to train. Simple arithmetic calculations indicate that if the mobilization reserves were not effectively mobilized in the past six months and if this is not being done now, a catastrophe will occur within a month or two.
Meanwhile, the work of draft boards remains as Soviet-style as it has always been. It is limited to meeting quantitative targets and capturing those who did not have time to escape or (by chance!) had no intention of hiding. No one ever thought of transforming this imitation of work into effective recruiting or even headhunting.
“No one is gathering the best, most motivated, and most needed individuals for the army. No one is actively seeking and registering volunteers, evaluating their suitability for military service, and assessing their potential combat-ready,” says Yevheniia Zakrevska, an author of an article, lawyer and soldier of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Perhaps Valeriy Markus (the initiator of the creation of the 47th Mechanized Brigade, which is being formed exclusively with volunteers) as well as Vladyslav Greziev and his recruiting agency (Lobby X), are exceptions. However, they cannot do this on a countrywide scale. No one filters the mobilized individuals at the entrance. There is no probationary period. Nothing of that sort. The work of draft boards as HR agencies for the army is nonexistent. No business would pay money for such services.
Second, the circle of soldiers in the army. Combat-ready soldiers are sent to the frontlines, while not combat-ready ones are kept in the rear
Combat-ready, motivated, and effective soldiers gradually migrate to the frontlines. This is normal. This is right. They are most needed there. However, at the rear, these soldiers face casualties, injuries, attrition, and disillusionment. Meanwhile, the not combat-ready soldiers, those who are afraid of something, those who are incapable and unwilling to fight, the majority of them end up in permanent bases or other rear de facto (but not always de jure) units — far away from the frontlines. Commanders on the frontlines do not need such individuals, and they try to minimize their presence. However…
Third, the inability to dismiss not combat-ready individuals from the army
However, it is impossible to discharge these not combat-ready individuals. Therefore, commanders try to at least send them away from sight — to a place where they will cause the least harm. Where? That’s right — to the rear. And that’s why not combat-ready individuals remain alive, healthy, employed, and continue to serve. They continue to receive financial support. They continue to occupy someone else’s position, filling the staff list. And their numbers keep growing and growing…
As a leader and employer, I would not only dismiss such individuals after their first failure or during a probationary period, but I wouldn’t hire them in the first place. However, during martial law, as I mentioned before, it is impossible to discharge them from the army. Neither “voluntarily,” nor “by mutual agreement,” nor “at the employer’s initiative.” There is no actual legal procedure in place. As a result, we end up with a platoon on the frontlines that is theoretically composed of 25 soldiers. And according to the staff list, it’s 25. But 10 of them are in the permanent base. Oh, now it’s 11,12. And this platoon has been fighting continuously for 10 months without breaks, vacations, or days off. There are no additional personnel available. No, we don’t need mobilization. Why rotation is needed? We still have these alive and somewhat breathing individuals. And the most important thing is that the staff list is filled.
“Accordingly, there are fewer and fewer motivated, combat-ready, effective people. After all, they are mostly at the frontline. And the survival rate is significantly lower at the frontline than at the permanent base. This is disappointing math,” says Yevheniia Zakrevska.
And when soldiers are killed or injured on the frontline, who replaces them? That’s right: those sent by the draft board. And there, the ratio of combat-ready soldiers to those not combat-ready is even worse than it was at the beginning of the problem.
Forth, the return of soldiers after injuries and concussions
And then there are the injured, the untreated, those with untreated concussions, with knees that don’t bend, with a hole in their skull, they are discharged as “combat-ready in extreme cases” or “partially combat-ready.” And where are they sent? That’s right — to the frontlines, referring back to the second point. Well, in other words, what happens to our actual ratio of “combat-ready” and “not combat-ready” — everyone understands. And according to the staff list, everything looks perfect again. Everything is filled.
And no, we don’t need any additional mobilization, training reserves, or rotation — the staff list is filled. Everything is fine.
Are there personnel problems? Undoubtedly. Do they need to be addressed? Definitely. Can these issues be resolved at the legislative level? Yes, partially. How?
First and foremost, in my opinion:
It is necessary to establish the legal possibility of dismissing individuals from the army “at the initiative of the employer,” that is, at the army’s initiative. The term “dishonorable” discharge, as coined by Oleksiy Beshulia, is very apt. This means without the status of a combatant, veteran benefits, and financial support. The army needs to get rid of not combat-ready individuals. First and foremost, it should separate obviously not combat-ready individuals, such as those with dependencies. Or even those without dependencies but who allow alcohol and other substances to affect their combat-ready and the readiness of their unit, endangering others.
A person who is unfit for service should not be serving. He or she should not receive monetary compensation, occupy a position in the rear, and not take up a spot in the staff list. The fact that the draft board overlooked these not combat-ready individuals should not hinder the removal of deadweight from the army, a deadweight that consumes resources and diminishes combat-ready. It distorts the overall picture of combat-ready, including for the command.
What does draft law 8271 propose?
Draft law 8271 proposes getting rid of such not combat-ready individuals through criminal cases. This is a very costly endeavor. Costly and time-consuming. Our country cannot afford such a luxury during the war. And in general, no country can. Not only during wartime.
“Imagine that you are an employer and, in order to fire a negligent employee, you need to initiate criminal proceedings against him or her. There is no other way,” noted Yevheniia Zakrevska, an author of an article, lawyer and soldier of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
At the same time, during this period, the individual will continue going to work. Other employees will witness this. The criminal investigation can last for months or even years. The person may not even be a criminal, just incapable of performing the job, incapable of performing any task in the army. Therefore, your conscience may prevent you from sending him to trial… But dismissal can only happen through a court verdict. And even that is not guaranteed. The verdict can be acquittal. Can you imagine? That’s roughly how the mentioned draft law “addresses” this problem. And for some reason, the authors of the draft law decided that the threat of criminal prosecution will magically transform not combat-ready individuals into capable and disciplined soldiers. Are you serious?
The problem of avatars (drinkers)
Another important point is that avatars cannot be dismissed from the army even so. After all, drinking in combat positions is an administrative offense. And bringing to administrative responsibility is not a ground for dismissal during martial law. Only a verdict in criminal proceedings that imposes a sentence of imprisonment, restriction of liberty, or deprivation of military rank is a ground for dismissal.
So, in principle, it is impossible to dismiss avatars. Not at all. You can catch them red-handed multiple times unless they kill someone or someone dies because of them. Can you imagine not being able to dismiss an employee who comes to work drunk? Not once or twice… You have evidence, he blew into the breathalyzer. You can punish him. But you cannot dismiss him. That’s it.
How does draft law 8271, which is “supposed to combat avatars and other disciplinary violators,” solve this problem? It doesn’t solve it at all.
It grants the Military Police the right to conduct alcohol or drug intoxication checks on military personnel. And then what? After 15 days, the avatar will return to its unit. And then refer back to the second point. Not to mention that I have never seen any personnel of Military Police within a 5-10 kilometer zone from the frontline, where the actual drinking problems are most dangerous… Alright, let’s give more powers to the Military Police to catch avatars in the rear. Catch them and send them back. But for what purpose?
Why did things get even worse?
Unfortunately, the mechanism proposed by Draft Law 8271 is not only ineffective, i.e., it does not make things better. It is counterproductive, which means it makes things much worse.
Why?
Because there is something called motivation and trust. The motivation of soldiers to fight, to carry out dangerous missions, to risk themselves, to learn, to improve their knowledge and skills, to develop. The motivation of volunteers to join the service. The motivation of potential conscripts to come when called, not to flee or evade. There is also the matter of trust between soldiers and their commanders, and the overall command. And vice versa. So, draft law 8271 kills this trust and kills motivation. The fact that it was proposed by the command and the General Staff has a very negative impact on the trust and motivation of soldiers. And if it is signed and becomes effective, it will be a catastrophe.
Fedir Venislavsky (Member of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) Committee on National Security, Defense, and Intelligence,) has calculated and says that draft law 8271 only concerns about 1% of dishonest military personnel. I believe that there are indeed approximately that many dishonest servicemen. However, it is not only dishonest military personnel who end up in the hands of investigators and the judiciary. Unfortunately, this draft law affects everyone or almost everyone. I do not know of any active and effective military personnel who couldn’t be potentially held accountable under one of these articles, for which responsibility has been strengthened and conditional sentences removed. Unless someone is extremely cautious, doesn’t do anything, doesn’t stand out anywhere, and just deals with paperwork. And even I could be targeted. For completely conscientious actions that didn’t lead to any losses or negative consequences, but sometimes, on the contrary, prevented them or contributed to the effective completion of tasks or improving the unit’s performance. But formally, they can be held criminally liable for them. And almost any commander has the resources to turn this “formal” into “real.” And some only need their conscience.
“I am a lawyer. I understand perfectly well how it works. And how difficult it will be to prove later that you are not a camel. Understand that any assumption of responsibility by a lower-ranking officer in a critical situation borders on disobedience. And sometimes it is a direct disobedience to an order. And at the request of a superior commander, it can become a legal “failure to obey an order,” noted Yevheniia Zakrevska.
But until this moment, I had the understanding that the Ukrainian army welcomes such a style of command, where commanders take responsibility. It is welcomed when the center of responsibility is lower-level commanders, the leaders of departments, and platoons, who make decisions on the spot and have the authority to do so. It’s not about saying “Yes, sir” and “May I, sir,” or “There was no order, I can’t know, I went to hell because of your order, I wish you good health.”
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So they should be commanders who are leaders, capable of leading people, not goons like in the Russian army, whose power is based on physical strength or the threat of criminal responsibility.
Exactly as Valeri Zaluzhnyi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said: “With all due respect to Mr. Surovikin (Russian army general and Commander of the Aerospace Forces), he is just a goon. You look at him and understand that either you carry out the task, or you’re done for. And we have long understood that this doesn’t work… Of course, we had our own goons who tried to maintain order with fists and biceps, but it doesn’t work 100% in the Ukrainian army… You can always be normal. To be normal means to remain human in any situation — that is the most important thing. To remain human, to become a leader. To be smarter, stronger, more talented, and then try to manage people. That is the religion I professed.”
Unfortunately, I no longer have such an understanding. Fighting in the army under authoritarian commanders (goons) does not inspire me.
Now, such commanders and rank and files who take responsibility can not only be prosecuted but also guaranteed to be imprisoned. And since the command is so clearly in favor of this law, it is obvious that this is exactly what some people really want. And this potential possibility will result in a flood of actual criminal investigations.
Why won’t these strict regulations work as announced?
The initiators of the draft law believe that it will help combat desertion, disobedience of orders, and prevent exposing frontline areas. We are talking about critical, extreme situations in which a person finds himself and potentially commits these crimes — fleeing the battlefield, not following orders. And if there is an understanding that physical violence is not effective as a threat, then criminal liability is certainly not effective either. The fear of death and fear, in general, is immediate, while criminal responsibility, whether it’s 5 or 8 years, is abstract and distant in a moment of mortal danger. It is not what restrains disobedience of orders or enables overcoming fear to stay on the battlefield, hold positions, or move forward.
Well, it means that the law makes the punishment harsher for those who got scared, fled, or didn’t move forward, but it doesn’t work as a preventive measure. It doesn’t prevent these actions from happening.
So, what does work? What actually works is the understanding that “you can’t leave your comrades in battle” and “you can’t forgive those who harm you.” And it’s the “only religion — the feeling that someone will avenge you later.” (The author quotes a poem by Serhiy Zhadan). Especially if there are leaders among the fighters, those who are willing to go forward and lead others, those whom you trust like yourself, and whom you would be ashamed to scare or turn back in front of.
So, what works is exactly what will destroy the draft law 8271. Those who least accept law 8271 work.
So, what should be done?
“To remain human, to become a leader. To be smarter, stronger, more talented, and then strive to lead people,” says the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
And also, to cultivate commanders and informal leaders, protect those who already exist, communicate with people, strengthen trust between commanders and soldiers, and work on unit cohesion.
That’s right. And that also works. Especially if this “religion” is practiced at all levels of command. It is also worth ensuring that unfit, unprepared, exhausted, and traumatized soldiers do not end up in such frontline areas. So that the psychological state of the soldiers at frontline is normal and their fighting spirit is high. Rotations should not last for six, ten months or more. Soldiers should not be sitting in trenches on the frontline for two, three, four months or more without a break — both for themselves and those not combat-ready in the rear. They should have the opportunity to go on leave and see their families and loved ones. (Just look at the statistics of the absence without leave soldiers — how many days have they been on leave since February 24? It’s unthinkable!)
So that the soldiers know that after a certain period of time, they will be replaced and they will have the option to be discharged if they wish, rather than resorting to desperate measures like getting injured or deserting. It is necessary for commanders and higher-level leadership to refrain from actions and decisions that undermine trust in commanders and the morale of the military.
Instead, we need to be stronger, smarter, and more talented.
That’s how we will win.
Originally posted by Yevheniia Zakrevska, lawyer and soldier of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on LB. ua. Translated and edited by the UaPosition – Ukrainian news and analytics website
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