Yuriy Kostenko
Member of the Parliament of Ukraine of five convocations (1990-2012), he served as Minister of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety from 1992 to 1998, the first head of the Ukrainian government delegation to the negotiations with the Russian Federation in Moscow on nuclear disarmament (1992-1993), head of the Ukrainian delegation to the negotiations with the G7 countries on the closure of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, author of the book History of Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine (Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, 2020), laureate of the Stanley Peterson Literary Fund (Canada, 2021), and Chairman of the Ukrainian People’s Party.
December 5 marked the 28th anniversary of the signing of the Budapest Memorandum. The direct participant of those tumultuous events explains, in the language of documents, what happened almost three decades ago.
Despite years of assessments of this document, both by top state officials and various politicians, experts, and even linguists (who still haven’t figured out the difference between “security guarantees” and “assurances of security”), the main question remains unanswered: Who betrayed Ukraine?
As a direct participant in those tumultuous events and the author of the book History of Ukraine’s Nuclear Disarmament, I want to explain in the language of state documents adopted during 1990-1994 why the Memorandum did not become a real guarantee of Ukraine’s security. And who should be held accountable for it.
The steps leading to the Budapest Memorandum
The first step of this long saga was the adoption by the Parliament of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) on July 16, 1990, of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine. Section 9, “External and Internal Security,” proclaimed the “intention to become a permanently neutral state in the future, which does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, produce, or acquire nuclear weapons.” It was a rather romantic and naive assurance that the future independent Ukraine would not pose a threat to anyone and wanted to live in peace with the world.
The second crucial step towards Budapest was the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) “On the Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine” dated October 24, 1991, which was declared after Ukraine’s Independence was proclaimed. In this statement, Ukraine expressed its intention to pursue a policy aimed at “the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the components of their deployment located on the territory of the Ukrainian state.”
And despite the fact that the Statement on Security Guarantees itself did not yet exist, on April 9, 1992, the parliament specified the tasks for the executive authorities regarding both the elimination of nuclear weapons and security guarantees through a special resolution that had the force of law, titled “On Additional Measures on Ensuring Ukraine’s Acquisition of Non-Nuclear Status”. In particular, the Verkhovna Rada halted the export of tactical nuclear warheads from Ukraine to Russia, which was being done without parliamentary permission and was a violation of the Law of Ukraine “On Ownership.” Instead, the resolution stated that it was advisable “not to export tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine until the development and implementation of a mechanism for international control over its destruction with the participation of Ukraine.”
Failure to implement international control over nuclear warheads
As known, international control was provided for by the START-1 Treaty regarding the destruction of strategic weapons, but not nuclear warheads themselves, only the missile launchers. Therefore, the Ukrainian Parliament identified the need for international control over the destruction of the nuclear warheads themselves, “which should ensure the non-use of nuclear components of these warheads for the re-creation of weapons and prohibit their export to other states.”
However, instead of implementing the parliamentary decision to establish a procedure for controlling the destruction of nuclear warheads, the Ukrainian government, under the influence of Moscow, hastily signed an intergovernmental agreement on the procedure for transferring nuclear warheads to Russia on April 17, 1992. This was done without any guarantees of their destruction or international oversight.
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The consequence of this was the accelerated removal of all without exception, nuclear warheads of tactical weapons (from 2.8 to 4.2 thousand units, only the USSR General Staff had accurate data) by May 5, 1992.
In November 1992, as the head of a special parliamentary working group responsible for nuclear disarmament issues and preparation for the ratification of the START-1 Treaty, I was granted access to a classified plant in Russia where the dismantlement of tactical weapons exported from Ukraine was taking place.
When I asked where and how the highly enriched uranium and plutonium were being destroyed after being extracted from the nuclear warheads, as demanded by the resolution of the Ukrainian Parliament, the representative of the Federal Security Service who accompanied me smiled and replied, “That is a state secret.” Later, Ukrainian specialists working at the plant conveyed to me the information that Russia continued to utilize the uranium and plutonium from Ukrainian weapons to produce new nuclear warheads.
Discrepancies in security guarantees and obligations
Regarding security guarantees, the parliamentary resolution entrusted the executive authorities to examine the entire complex of issues related to Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament “from the perspective of security guarantees and Ukraine’s foreign policy interests, including the use of its components for peaceful purposes.”
But even this parliamentary decision was “implemented” in a completely different manner. On May 7, 1992, at the initiative of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President Leonid Kravchuk, in a letter to President George Bush, undertook obligations regarding Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament that were different from those adopted by the parliament in its resolution. Specifically, it stated: “Ukraine will ensure the destruction of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive weapons located on its territory, in accordance with the relevant agreements within a seven-year period, as provided for by the START Treaty and in the context of the Statement on Ukraine’s Non-Nuclear Status.”
There was no mention of “security guarantees, international control over the destruction of nuclear warheads, and the use of their components for peaceful purposes” as defined by the Ukrainian Parliament in Kravchuk’s letter.
Once again, the Ukrainian Parliament clearly formulated the principles and stages of Ukraine’s path to a non-nuclear status, as well as security guarantees, in its reservations during the ratification of the START-1 Treaty on November 18, 1993. Two proposals were considered during a closed session of the parliament.
The first proposal was put forward by President Kravchuk, which involved the elimination of all strategic nuclear weapons located on the territory of Ukraine within seven years. In addition, Kravchuk suggested simultaneous ratification of the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) along with START. In this case, Ukraine was to join the NPT not as a nuclear-weapon state but as a non-nuclear state. However, Kravchuk’s proposals did not provide answers to questions regarding security guarantees for Ukraine and whose nuclear weapons the non-nuclear Ukraine would be obligated to destroy on its territory.
The parliament overwhelmingly rejected all of the president’s proposals. Later, in his comments, Kravchuk called this decision of the parliament “the biggest political mistake”.
At this session, the Verkhovna Rada supported the proposal of the special working group. It involved the ratification of only the START-1 Treaty but with a series of reservations. Specifically, the proposal called for the elimination of not all weapons, but only the portion specified in the Lisbon Protocol, signed in May 1992. According to the protocol, instead of the USSR, the newly established nuclear states — Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia — were required to destroy only a portion of their strategic nuclear weapons (36% of strategic carriers and 42% of nuclear warheads).
In addition, the parliament decided that Ukraine will exchange instruments of ratification (i.e., initiate the disarmament process) only after the fulfillment of conditions specified in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11.”
Among these conditions, paragraph 11 specifically concerned its security guarantees: “considering that Ukraine did not directly participate in the negotiations for the development of the Treaty, it is recommended to the President of Ukraine and the Government of Ukraine to conduct negotiations with relevant states and international organizations regarding international guarantees of Ukraine’s national security.”
Regarding the simultaneous ratification of the START-1 Treaty and the NPT in the status of a non-nuclear state, as proposed by Kravchuk, the parliament decided that only the entry into force of START (i.e., the fulfillment by other countries of all reservations of the Verkhovna Rada) “will pave the way for the parliament to address the issue of joining the NPT.”
However, the president completely ignored all the warnings of the Verkhovna Rada this time on the previous decisions of the Ukrainian Parliament, how should Ukraine move towards a nuclear-free status and guarantees of its national security.
The Trilateral Statement and its impact on Ukraine’s disarmament
However, on January 14, 1994, Kravchuk, together with Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, signed the so-called Trilateral Statement and its appendix in Moscow, effectively undermining all the fundamental decisions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Specifically, President Kravchuk agreed with the Russian proposal not to destroy the nuclear warheads and to transfer them to Russia, rather than dismantling them under international control as demanded by the parliamentary resolutions. Moreover, instead of the 42% specified in the ratification resolution of the Verkhovna Rada, all 100% of the warheads were to be transferred, and within a record period of seven years.
As for security guarantees, it was precisely in the Trilateral Statement that the entire list of paper promises, introduced by the Kremlin, emerged, which later became part of the Budapest Memorandum. Today, they are diplomatically referred to not as security guarantees but as “empty pieces of paper.”
The last attempt to obtain legally binding security guarantees for Ukraine was made on November 16, 1994, during the ratification of the NPT. This event took place under a new parliamentary session and a new president. The Law of Ukraine “On the Accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968” was adopted.
“This Law should enter into force after the nuclear-weapon states provide Ukraine with security guarantees in the form of the signing of a relevant international legal document,” stated Article 6 of the Treaty.
Therefore, on December 5, 1994, only the lawyers from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by the experienced internationalist-minister Udovenko, did not fully understand what they were presenting for the president of Ukraine to sign. Or perhaps they knew very well.
“It was absolutely clear to the United States that the American side would not use force in this case” (regarding Ukraine), said the Former US Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer.
So it was essentially not about security guarantees but only assurances of non-aggression towards Ukraine. As events in Ukraine in 2014 demonstrated, Russia also understood very well at that time what it was signing.
Consequences of betrayal and the need for accountability
The consequences of this substitution of legal obligations by the signatories of the Budapest Memorandum are horrifying today. Not only because one of the “security guarantors” is at war with Ukraine, seeking to destroy the state and the entire Ukrainian people, who, in order to save the world from nuclear threats, gave up all their weapons to those who now threaten to destroy this world. For all the other countries, Budapest was a kind of signal that the era of peaceful coexistence and search for political compromise is over. There is only a new arms race, including nuclear ones, and a growing threat of nuclear apocalypse ahead.
The history of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament, as presented in the book, provides documentary evidence regarding the actions or inaction of government authorities and high-ranking officials who were involved in the nuclear disarmament process, which ultimately enabled Russian aggression. However, this “History” alone is insufficient for a complete understanding of what subsequently happened to Ukraine’s military potential. It is well-known that at the time of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the Ukrainian army was the largest and best-equipped in Europe. In addition to nuclear weapons, Ukraine’s military at that time consisted of 780,000 personnel, 6,500 tanks, 7,000 infantry fighting vehicles, 7,200 artillery systems, 350-500 ships and vessels, and 1,100-1,500 combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Advanced missile defense and air defense systems were deployed on the territory of Ukraine, and military bases and depots were filled with ammunition and supplies. In other words, Ukraine possessed all the resources that Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines tragically lack today.
That is why the question “who betrayed Ukraine and how?” should be raised today not only in the context of the Budapest Memorandum but also in relation to those numerous officials who have disarmed the Ukrainian state during the years of independence. This topic should definitely become the subject of a special parliamentary investigation.
It is imperative to do this not for revenge, but both for former and current leaders. This is a moral duty of the authorities to those thousands of Ukrainians who are paying with their lives for the political and state treason of officials today.
Originally posted by Yuriy Kostenko on Universum. Translated and edited by the UaPosition – Ukrainian news and analytics website
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