Over the past three days, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have advanced to the center of the village of Robotyne. Offensive operations in the Zaporizhzhia direction are ongoing, creating opportunities for breaking through the first line of Russian defense and allowing the Ukrainian Armed Forces to gain advantageous positions for subsequent lines towards Tokmak. Tokmak is a key city that opens the route to Melitopol and the Azov Sea. Ukrainians are also taking positions that offer the prospect of encircling Russians near Bakhmut.
In the area between the border and the Donetsk River, in the direction of Kupiansk, Ukrainians are, however, defending against Russian offensive operations. Limited clashes are occurring on the foothold on the left bank of the Dnipro River in the Kherson region. In this brief overview of the current combat actions, it’s noticeable that in the Robotyne direction or in the Bakhmut region, battles within the framework of the so-called counteroffensive have been ongoing for many weeks. Few people, particularly in Ukraine, are familiar with the name of the village Robotyne, even though it holds significant importance for operational military plans.
Ukrainians didn’t expect such news after two months of offensive operations that were proclaimed as a significant breakthrough. While in Ukraine there’s a realization of how much blood soldiers are shedding in the struggle for every kilometer of the bullet-ridden steppe and how challenging it is to breach the formidable defensive lines of the aggressor, in Europe or America, if it has come to that, another day of reports about advances in the vicinity of villages with strange names evokes different sentiments. Even suspicions arise: is there even a Ukrainian advance underway? And what are the chances that the war will conclude within a foreseeable timeframe if both sides can’t move beyond the Donetsk-Mariupol steppes?
Such questions and thoughts particularly frustrate Ukrainians. Especially now, as they celebrate Independence Day, they are certain that Russians won’t hold back and will initiate another round of massive air attacks.
Sirens of air alarms once again wail over the country — MiG-31s armed with hypersonic Korsar missiles have taken to the air. Drones attacked the Odesa region during the night. These are the everyday realities for Ukrainians. They, too, are weary, but unlike those fatigued by the war in the West, they cannot turn off the television with war news or scroll through Twitter in search of less stressful information.
Give us more weapons!
Ukrainian efforts aimed at obtaining a greater quantity of new types of weapons have gained impressive momentum. It began with the delivery of handheld anti-tank missile systems like Javelin and NLAW. These were crucial during the initial, maneuvering stage of Russian aggression, allowing lightweight Ukrainian formations to pursue advancing Russian armored columns. Then, after a meeting of a group of nations supporting Ukraine in Ramstein last year, the assistance became more structured. In May of this year, Lloyd Austin, the head of the Pentagon, acknowledged that overall, the states supporting Ukraine had provided it with weaponry worth $65 billion USD (more than Germany’s defense budget, which, ultimately, isn’t entirely dedicated to armament).
Artillery arrived on the stabilizing front line, followed by small arms, ammunition, the first combat vehicles, and finally, tanks. Poland and other countries in the region were among the first to offer substantial assistance by providing post-Soviet-era weapons (including T-72 tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, 2S1 howitzers, and more). Poland also supplied modern Krab howitzers. Zenith missile systems such as Patriot and Iris-T were sent to Ukraine, along with others. Lastly, there were the impactful Himars missile complexes and Storm Shadow missiles.
It didn’t come without disagreements and false starts. Like, for example, the confusion from last year with supposedly already delivered MiG-29s, which ultimately arrived later. Or the dispute over Germany’s resistance to tank deliveries. Overall, the Western coalition acted to the rhythm of its own calendar, driven by the capability to refurbish equipment retrieved from storage, the abundance of arsenals, and above all, the will of politicians who were mindful of their pacifist electorate and feared involvement in a war. From the Ukrainian side, there were constant appeals and requests for the provision of new equipment. Volodymyr Zelenskyy could have coined himself a motto: give us more weapons! He so frequently repeats this plea during meetings abroad.
See also: How much more weapons does Russia have? Calculation of enemy losses and capabilities
The latest item on the agenda, around which diplomatic battles are being fought, is the multi-role F-16 fighters. After Zelenskyy’s recent visits to the Netherlands and Denmark, it became known that these countries, with the support of the United States, would provide Ukraine with several dozen Falcon Sixteen aircraft. This decision was likely made many months ago, and there were only technical consultations, coordination of details, and diplomatic disagreements.
Blood-saving approach
There’s no doubt that Western countries are making their calculations when supplying equipment; they assess how it could lead to an escalation of the war and contribute to its cessation. Recently, for example, it was revealed that despite negotiations, Sweden will not be transferring its Gripen fighters for the time being. Squadrons of F-16s will undoubtedly greatly enhance Ukraine’s capabilities and provide a defensive umbrella and support for front-line operations. However, the involvement of the F-16s in combat actions is unlikely to take place this year, unless it’s postponed to the next.
From Kyiv, words of frustration are increasingly heard, indicating that deliveries are progressing slower than promised. And time on the front has its cost — the blood of Ukrainian soldiers. For instance, the British publication The Economist asserts that out of several hundred promised Leopard tanks, Ukraine has received only 60 so far. Serhiy Leshchenko, an advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine, admitted that the disparity in deliveries compared to the announced numbers is particularly concerning and demotivating.
Ukrainian soldiers acknowledge that they lack resources for frontal attacks. They are unable to conduct swift operations involving large tactical brigades, for example. In short, there will be no Verdun or Somme on this front line. Currently, Russians also cannot afford frontal offensive operations. Ukrainians hold their equipment and soldiers in high regard. Between the positions currently held by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Tokmak (which, by the way, has been transformed into a well-fortified fortress), three lines of defense of Russian troops are situated — networks of trenches, barriers, and minefields with artillery support. Ukrainians mention that it would have been easier if they had more engineering equipment, anti-mine vehicles, and air support. Even in NATO armies, resources for engineering equipment are limited, and F-16 air support will have to be awaited. However, the demining of fields and the capturing of trenches one by one, to minimize their own losses, continue. After significant initial losses in early June, the Ukrainian headquarters is simply safeguarding its personnel. Perhaps, it’s waiting for the right moment and might initiate a more extensive offensive in early autumn, but it’s most likely that both sides will enter the winter period with a relatively stabilized front, similar to its current state, with minor adjustments. This won’t be the best situation for Ukraine. However, it’s not favorable for Russia either.
Russian fatigue
It’s difficult to gauge how fatigued the Russian society is due to the war. It is undoubtedly adapting to the new situation. And it certainly possesses a different kind of resilience — the kind that allowed it to endure prolonged wars in Afghanistan or Chechnya. Both wars were fought outside of Russia and were bloody, but neither of them affected society and the economy as much as the war in Ukraine. However, the war is gradually reaching Russia as well. In the form of drone attacks in Moscow, Crimea, or other cities, often far removed from Ukraine.
The war is also reaching Russia through raids by “volunteer Russians” in the bordering Belgorod region. Or indirectly, like the so-called Prigogine rebellion in June. But most significantly, the war reaches the consciousness of Russians through news of burials of their loved ones, returning from the front in coffins, or through draft notices. And of course, there are the economic costs of war: the value of the ruble is plummeting, GDP is declining, and the economy is on the brink of collapse.
Exhaustion is catching up with the aggressor’s armed forces as well. According to Ukrainian assessments, the Russian army has lost a quarter of a million personnel. Even if the actual losses are smaller, they have already reached unprecedented proportions in modern armed conflicts, which the entire population feels. The Russian army on the front lines, as numerous reports indicate, is undergoing a phase of deep demoralization. It faces constant problems with the supply of basic necessities, ammunition, equipment, and spare parts. Recently, for instance, a significant problem has emerged with tires for trucks and transporters. They are simply in short supply, and the Russian industry can’t keep up with production.
Russia is forced to buy tires from China. Despite the initiation of three-shift production in defense plants and the adaptation of industry to wartime production, it doesn’t even come close to the production scale of the Cold War era, not to mention the efforts of the Second World War. An inefficient, technologically outdated economy with a shortage of labor cannot withstand this demand. It can produce goods to sustain the current state of the army capable of holding back Ukrainians on the front lines, but it cannot supply the army to the extent that it can break free from its current predicament.
The situation with the occupied territories is even more problematic. In essence, they are now “wild fields.” Depopulated, with ruined infrastructure, and inhabited mainly by retirees and those who have chosen not to leave. Maintaining these territories (including Crimea and the Donetsk-Luhansk region) is costly and brings little benefit. In the case of Crimea, one could argue its role as a military-naval base that controls NATO’s presence in the Black Sea. The rest of the territories merely serve as the front-line zone in the war for control over Ukraine.
However, Putin understands well that the psychological resilience of Russian society and its readiness to endure suffering are much higher than in Western societies. Despite Russia itself approaching extreme war fatigue, he simultaneously reinforces the narrative of “war weariness,” directed towards the West (and Ukraine as well). Moscow also claims that the resistance of Kyiv to recognize the Russian occupation of nearly a fifth of the country’s territory is to blame for everything. Moscow’s claims, of course, are bluffing. The prolongation of the war is due to too scarce and slow arms deliveries. The Kremlin also isn’t interested in taking over costly-to-maintain, devastated territories. Instead, it aims to gain an advantage and a launching pad for further expansion into Ukraine. It seeks to introduce an element of disillusionment into Kyiv’s politics, which would become a fertile ground for chaos and political strife.
Originally posted by Michał Kacewicz on Nowa Europa Wschodnia. Translated and edited by the UaPosition – Ukrainian news and analytics website
See also: Ukraine is not Vietnam: why Russians are willing to kill “their boys” endlessly
