Lessons from 2022 The impracticality of alleged pragmatism Internal politics of war and peace Ukraine’s Crimea and the mainland Conclusions and recommendations There is an intense public debate about when and how to end the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Many proposals for a swift end to the fighting through a ceasefire or a peace agreement implicitly or explicitly assume or suggest territorial concessions from Ukraine. Their proponents either fail to appreciate the interconnections between the Russian annexations of 2014 and 2022, or deliberately ignore them. The expression of the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in ХІХ century, that “politics is the art of the possible,” could express the creed of many self-proclaimed pragmatists commenting on Russia’s war against Ukraine. Some of them are now calling for immediate negotiations and a ceasefire between Kyiv and Moscow. They indirectly or directly suggest Ukrainian territorial concessions to Russia in order to achieve peace in Eastern Europe. Such proposals do not necessarily reflect ethical or legal nihilism. Even many seemingly pragmatic proponents of swift negotiations on the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war acknowledge Ukraine’s right to self-defense. Some even speak of the desirability of fully restoring its borders. Nevertheless, they assume Kyiv or the West lack sound political judgment and strategic prudence by continuing an aggressive approach towards Moscow. From this perspective, Western support for Ukraine is motivated by impractical ideals. According to this belief, political pragmatism, rather than lofty idealism, would better serve the cause of peace and ultimately Ukraine’s interests. Lessons from 2022 As demonstrated in the past year, the assessment of what is realistic or not in the Russian-Ukrainian war can be fluid. Until February 2022, the assumption that Ukraine would quickly fall apart due to the full-scale Russian military attack seemed rational to many. Some commentators even suggested suspending Western arms supplies to the Ukrainians, as it was seen as merely prolonging the inevitable agony of their state in the event of escalation. Such an approach underestimated Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian sentiment, facilitated Russian expansionist ambitions by publicly conveying that Ukraine is weak, suggesting that Kyiv would not benefit from significant Western support, and demobilizing mainstream Western sympathy for democratic Ukraine. The patriotic sentiments and military professionalism of Ukrainians were not appreciated. Although these voices did not prevail, they were present, shaping public discourse and influencing policy. Much of their apparent...